The roles of import competition and export opportunities for technical change by Steinwender, Claudia
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1334 
February 2015 
The Roles of Import Competition and Export 
Opportunities for Technical Change 
Claudia Steinwender 
Abstract 
A variety of empirical and theoretical trade papers have suggested and documented a positive impact 
of trade on the productivity of firms. However, there is less consensus about the underlying 
mechanism at work. While trade papers focus on access to export markets, other papers stress the 
importance of import competition. Since imports and exports (and even tariffs affecting either) are 
usually highly correlated, it is unclear which mechanism the existing empirical papers uncover. This 
paper conducts a “horse race” between export opportunities and import competition. Using Spanish 
firm level data, instrumenting for exports and imports with tariff changes and controlling for 
selection, I find robust evidence that access to export markets leads to productivity increases, but only 
for firms that were already highly productive before. The evidence on import competition is weaker. 
If anything, initially low-tech firms manage to increase their productivity in response to increased 
competition from abroad. The latter finding is at odds with most trade models, so I propose a model 
incorporating non-profit maximizing managers to reconcile theory with the evidence. Empirically, I 
find that all productivity upgrades are driven by increased R&D, patenting, and product innovation. 
Access to export markets also leads to the adaptation of foreign technologies. There is no evidence 
that either mechanism leads to increased full time employment, instead full time workers seem to be 
replaced by part-time or temporary workers. 
Keywords: Import competition, technical change, productivity, exporting 
JEL codes: F12; F13; F14; L25 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Globalisation Programme. The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
I thank Luis Garicano, Steve Redding, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Richard Blundell and especially Steve 
Pischke, as well as seminar participants at London School of Economics, for their comments. I 
acknowledge financial support from McKinsey & Co. for acquiring the data. 
Claudia Steinwender is a Post-Doctoral Researcher at Princeton University and a Post-
Doctoral Fellow at Harvard Business School and an Associate at the Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics.  
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 C. Steinwender, submitted 2015. 
1 Introduction
A variety of papers have empirically established the positive impact of trade on the productivity of firms.
However, there is less consensus about the underlying mechanism at work: While the trade literature has
typically focused on access to export markets as reason for productivity upgrades (e.g. Lileeva and Trefler
2010; De Loecker 2007; Bustos 2011; Pavcnik 2002), some papers, especially in the industrial organizations
literature, have stressed increased competition from foreign entrants (e.g. Aghion et al. 2009; Blundell
et al. 1995; Bloom et al. 2011; Tybout 2004; also Aghion et al. 2014 in a lab experiment).
Unfortunate for empirical investigations of causal effects is that increased export opportunities usually
coincide with increased competition from abroad, as most trade liberalization episodes are bilateral and
increase trade in both directions (even within narrowly defined industries). Regressions focusing on
either the import or the export side omit an important variable and might pick up the productivity effect
caused by it. Note that using tariff changes as instruments for imports or exports does not solve the
problem either, as for the same reason own tariff changes are usually highly correlated with tariff changes
abroad.
This paper disentangles whether import competition and/or access to export markets drive produc-
tivity gains from trade.1 This is important, because each mechanism might have different implications:
Larger export markets give firms the opportunity to expand and increase employment, while increasing
competition might force firms to contract and reduce their workforce.
In theory both export opportunities and import competition could lead to productivity upgrades of
firms. Several trade theory papers show that firms can be induced by export opportunities to upgrade their
productivity (e.g. Melitz and Costantini 2007; Bustos 2011; Atkeson and Burstein 2010). In standard trade
models with CES preferences markups are constant and unaffected by import competition. With variable
markups as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), import competition decreases the incentive to innovate
as profits fall. However, there are a variety of (not necessarily trade) models that predict an increase
in innovation resulting from competition, for example relying on trapped factors (Bloom et al. 2013),
non-profit maximizing managers and X-inefficiency (Aghion et al. 1999; Horn et al. 1995), a differential
impact of competition on post- and pre-innovation rents (Aghion et al. 2005), or imitation based on a
search model (Waugh et al. 2014).
It is plausible to think that import competition and access to export markets affect different types of
firms. For example, the market access mechanism is only relevant for firms that are eventually able to
export, or at least think they might have the capacity to do so. It is widely known in the trade literature
that these are typically only the most productive firms in an industry. Bustos (2011) and Lileeva and
Trefler (2010) show that mostly large firms increase productivity as response to export access. There is
less consensus about which firms might be induced by import competition to upgrade their productivity.
On one hand, import competition could be more relevant for firms with low profits, which are close to the
border of bankruptcy and want to avoid exit. On the other hand, import competition could discourage
already unproductive firms from trying harder, whereas already productive firms might be induced
1Only a few papers focus on the response of productivity to both increased imports and exports. Pavcnik (2002) finds
productivity increases among incumbents in import-competing industries but not in exporting industries, but does not allow for
both forces to affect different firms within the same industry. In contrast, Trefler (2004) incorporates both import and export
tariffs of the US and Canada and finds in firm level regressions that only the export effect is a significant driver of productivity
increases, but he is not able to control for a selection effect as he has no information on firm exits, in contrast to this paper.
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to innovate in order to escape competition. For example, Aghion et al. (2005) provide evidence that
competition discourages firms with initially lower productivity from innovating but encourages already
productive firms to innovate more in order to escape competition. In contrast, Waugh et al. (2014) show
in a theory model that firms at the lower end of the productivity distribution are more incentivized by
import competition to update productivity because they can gain more, but they do not provide empirical
evidence for this mechanism. This paper allows for heterogeneous responses to both the export access
and import competition mechanism.
Summarizing, this paper attempts to answer the following questions: Do import competition and/or
access to export opportunities induce firms to increase their productivity? Is there a heterogeneity in the
productivity response? And finally, how do firms achieve productivity increases?
Using Spanish firm level data, the main empirical specification in this paper is a regression of
productivity on both imports and exports of an industry as measures for import competition and export
opportunities to address the omitted variables bias, and interactions of those measures with a firm’s initial
productivity to allow for heterogeneous responses. I estimate this regression in first differences to take
out firm specific, time-invariant factors, and add firm level fixed effect and year fixed effects to consider
only deviations from firm specific growth rates. Both import and export changes are instrumented with
changes in domestic and foreign trade tariffs to address the remaining endogeneity problem.
The Spanish data set used has a number of variables that allows me to carefully address several
common pitfalls in the literature: For example, it provides firm specific input and output price changes
that allow me to obtain a measure of total factor productivity that is not driven by changes in markups.
Besides this, it is necessary to control for selection, as firms that are hit very hard by a negative productivity
shock exit the sample, and the effect of trade on productivity might be overestimated. The Spanish data
includes a measure for firm exits (as opposed to non response, which many data sets cannot distinguish
from exits) and allows me to control for selection. Furthermore, I show that import competition is not
picking up the effect of better access to imported inputs, and that firms which increase their productivity
because they are exposed to export opportunities increase their exports at the extensive and intensive
margin.
The results suggest that empirical papers focusing on import competition pick up the effect of access to
export markets by omitting this variable. On average, the impact of export opportunities on productivity
is large and significant, while the impact of import competition is small and insignificant. However, this
masks a high degree of heterogeneity with respect to both mechanisms. Access to export markets leads
to productivity increases only for firms that were already very productive. On the other hand, if anything,
import competition induces only initially low-tech firms managing to upgrade their productivity.
The latter result is surprising, as standard trade models predict the opposite: Increased import
competition reduces markups and profits, but more so for less productive firms, providing them with less
incentive to innovate. I therefore provide a trade model that is consistent with the empirical findings. I
add non-profit maximizing managers to a Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model extended to an endogenous
productivity choice. Managers receive a fixed salary if the firm exists, which introduces convexity in
their payoff function. As a result, increased import competition induces those managers to upgrade
productivity by more.
A final contribution of this paper lies in shedding light on the way how firms increase their productivity.
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Most empirical papers focus on labor productivity or total factor productivity, exceptions are Bloom et al.
(2011) who include patents, IT spending and R&D spending for subsets of their data, and Bustos (2011)
who distinguishes between process and product innovation. The rich Spanish firm level data used in this
paper includes most of these variables such as R&D investment, patenting, product innovation, but also
other variables such as adaptation of foreign technologies or implementation of other technologies (e.g.
computer-aided design CAD). I find that productivity upgrades are driven by increased R&D, patenting,
and product innovation, and the adaptation of certain technologies like CAD. Productive firms with
access to export markets also start assimilating foreign technologies, but import competition does not
induce firms to do so. There is no evidence that either mechanism leads to increased full time employment,
instead full time workers seem to be replaced by part-time or temporary workers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a description of the used
Spanish firm level data of manufacturing firms that allows for TFP estimation and the analysis of firm
exits, and provides a rich set of outcome variables. Section 3 provides an overview of Spain’s trade flows,
which have grown strongly over the observed 15 years. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and
section 5 discusses and interprets the empirical results. In section 6 I provide a trade model with non-profit
maximizing managers that is consistent with the heterogeneous effect of both import competition and
export access on productivity. Section 7 concludes.
2 Description of Data
This paper uses panel data from a Spanish survey of manufacturing firms (ESEE; Encuesta Sobre Estrate-
gias Empresariales), that is collected by the Fundación SEPI, a foundation affiliated with the Spanish
Ministry of Finance and Public Administration.2 The survey is designed to cover a representative sample
of Spanish Manufacturing firms and includes around 1,800 firms per year. Participation of firms with
more than 200 employees is required, while firms with more than 10 but less than 200 employees are
sampled via a stratified sampling approach. SEPI makes a great effort to replace non-responding and
exiting firms to ensure the continuing representativeness of the sample, leading to a total number of
around 4,000 observed firms between 1993 and 2007.
The most distinctive feature of this data set is the very rich information it provides on several
dimensions that are important for careful empirical investigation: Detailed capital stock and investment
needed for TFP estimation; input and output price changes to distinguish TFP changes from markup
changes; information on exits (distinct from non-response) and entry to deal with selection; and a wide
variety of productivity related activities such as R&D, patenting, and the adaptation of certain technologies
(e.g. use of robots, computer aided design, flexible manufacturing systems).
Total factor productivity. We need detailed data on capital stock, output, employment and intermedi-
ate inputs to estimate TFP at the firm level. In many firm level data sets capital stock is not available and
must be reconstructed using investment data (often using only average depreciation rates). The problem
of a missing initial capital stock is only negligible if data over a long period of time is available and initial
capital stock is depreciated for much of the observed sample period. Fortunately, the Spanish data set
provides both gross and net capital stock together with firm level depreciation and investment, which
2For more information see http://www.fundacionsepi.es/esee/sp/spresentacion.asp
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allows a precise construction of the capital stock at any point in time.
Estimation of total factor productivity by OLS suffers from several problems: Employment and capital
choices are endogenous, and TFP cannot easily be distinguished from markup changes (Beveren 2012). I
use the well-established Levinsohn-Petrin procedure to deal with the endogeneity problem, which uses
intermediate inputs to control for unobserved expected productivity changes. This is preferable to the
Olley-Pakes method which uses investment as control, because investment is often reported as zero,
which casts doubt on the validity of the assumed monotonicity condition requiring that investment is
strictly increasing in unobserved productivity. The monotonicity condition is more likely to be satisfied
for intermediate inputs, as firms usually report positive numbers.
Beveren (2012) points out that policy evaluations are usually robust to the TFP estimation method,
with one exception: It is necessary to control for input and output prices (Loecker 2011). Luckily, the
Spanish firm level survey provides a remedy to this omitted price bias as it also reports input and output
prices. Firms are asked by how much % the sales price of its products and the purchasing price of its
intermediate inputs and services has changed compared to the previous year. The price changes are a
weighted average across final products and markets (for output prices), and a weighted average across
intermediate inputs, energy consumption and purchased services (for input prices), which I use to deflate
output and intermediate inputs at the firm level (instead of usually used industry-wide deflators).
The results in this paper are robust to using different productivity measures such as labor productivity
and simple TFP fixed effects estimation.
Exits. Empirical papers focusing on import competition face another problem, as they might falsely
pick up a positive effect on productivity, because firms that are hit very hard by a negative productivity
shock exit the sample. Without correcting for this selection effect, the effect of trade on productivity
might be overestimated. Unfortunately in many data sets it is not possible to distinguish exiting from
non responding firms. The Spanish data set used however provides this information, as it follows up on
non-responding firms to determine their status. Exiting firms include closed firms, firms in liquidation,
and firms that are taken over by other firms. Annual exit rates in this sample are between 0.1% and 2.5%.
Other productivity related activities. In order to understand what firms do in order to increase
productivity, I use a variety of productivity related activities such as R&D expenditure, number of filed
patents, and product innovation. Every four years the survey contains additional questions about the
use of specific technologies. These technologies are the use of robots, computer aided design (CAD) and
flexible manufacturing systems. Furthermore the survey asks whether firms make an effort to assimilate
foreign technologies, which is might potentially respond to trade liberalization.
Trade and tariff data. This paper exploits the variation in industry-specific imports and exports over
time. I merge the firm-level data with industry level trade data from COMTRADE using the NACECLIO
industry classification of firms (20 NACECLIO categories3). Section 3 provides an overview of Spain’s
imports and exports over time and by industry. I use the tariffs that the EU imposes on imports from
the rest of the world (“import tariffs”) and tariffs that other countries impose on imports from the EU
3The 20 industries are: Meat related products; Food and tobacco; Beverage; Textiles and clothing; Leather, fur and footwear;
Timber; Paper; Printing and publishing; Chemicals; Plastic and rubber products; Nonmetal mineral products; Basic metal
products; Fabricated metal products; Industrial and agricultural equipment; Office machinery, data processing, precision
instruments and similar; Electric materials and accessories; Vehicles and accessories; Other transportation materials; Furniture;
Miscellaneous.
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(“export tariffs”) as instrumental variable for trade flows. All trade and tariff data used in the analysis is
from COMTRADE (provided by UNSD) and TRAINS (provided by UNCTAD); all data sets are accessed
via the WITS software provided by the World Bank.4
3 Trade growth in Spain
This paper uses import and export growth in Spain between 1993 and 2007 as source of variation in access
to export markets and import competition. Trade has grown substantially over this time period. Figure 1
shows that Spain’s world exports in 2007 (171 bn EUR) were almost four times larger than in 1993 (45 bn
EUR). Spain’s world imports grew even stronger, from 60 bn EUR in 1993 to 265 bn EUR in 2007. The
trade growth was not entirely linear (neither in levels nor in logs): It increased strongly in the 90’s, slowed
down in the early 2000’s, and picked up again around 2003 (especially imports). Spain incurred a trade
deficit from goods trade in every single year over the observed time period. The trade deficit increased
from around 2% of GDP to a staggering 10% of GDP at the end of the sample period.
Most of Spain’s trade is with the European Union: In 2007, 73% of Spain’s exports went to EU25
countries, compared to 60% of imports. Figure 2 graphs Spain’s trade with its most important trading
partners over time. A large share of exports are destined for Spain’s neighboring countries in Europe:
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Great Britain. Among those, exports to France have increased the
most over the sample period. Most of Spain’s imports are also coming from EU countries: Germany
has the largest import share, followed by France and Italy. However, imports from China have been
skyrocketing: China’s share in Spain’s imports has increased from 2% in 1993 to 6% in 2007.
Table 1 shows that the rise of China is most prevalent in certain industries like leather/fur/footwear,
textiles/clothing, and nonmetal mineral products. Table 2 lists the top 3 export destinations by industry.
Portugal has become a prominent destination for computer products and electronics; printing and
publishing; leather, fur and footwear; and nonmetal mineral products. But also United Kingdom and the
United States have increasingly become the destination for Spain’s exports.
Overall, the distribution of trade across industries has remained fairly stable over time. Figure 3 shows
that the most important export and import industry is vehicles and accessories, covering a quarter of
exports and one fifth of imports. Second is the chemicals sector, followed by industrial and agricultural
equipment. The food industry ranks fourth among Spanish exports. The dominant industries have only
become more dominant over time.
Researchers have attributed the increased trade with EU countries to increased European integration
that came with the introduction of the euro, the European Single Market, and the European Monetary
Union (e.g. Berger and Nitsch 2008; Bergin and Lin 2012; Brouwer et al. 2008). Another important trade
liberalization episode that occurred during the sample period was China’s accession to the WTO in 2001,
which was accompanied by a fall of tariff and non-tariff barriers between China and the European Union,
among others, and led to increased trade with China (e.g. Bloom et al. 2011).
4http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/
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4 Empirical strategy
Import competition versus export opportunities. How do access to export markets (“export opportuni-
ties”) and competition from foreign firms (“import competition”) affect firm productivity? In order to test
this, I estimate the following firm-level equation that relates a firm’s productivity (TFP) to measures of
export access (EXP) and import competition (IMP):
TFPist  β0   β1 IMPst   β3EXPst   yearFE  firmFE  ε ist (4.1)
where i indicates the firm, s indicates one of 20 industries (NACECLIO classification), and t is year
(between 1993 and 2007). The main empirical measure for TFPist is obtained via Levinsohn-Petrin
estimation (using material inputs to control for unobserved productivity) with an extra adjustment for
changes in input and output prices, as described above.
Spain’s world imports at the industry level are used as proxy for competition from foreign firms to
domestic firms IMPst (instead of a firm’s actual imports, because firm imports are inputs and not outputs,
but I want to measure import competition at the level of a firm’s end product). Similarly, access to export
markets EXPst is proxied by Spain’s world exports in industry s and year t (instead of actual firm level
exports, to proxy for potential export opportunities to the firm). Year fixed effects control for unobserved
common time trends, and firm level fixed effects control for unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity at
the firm level. All variables are in logs.
I proceed by estimating this equation in first differences, which controls for unobserved firm hetero-
geneity, as the firm level fixed effects cancel out. However, industries might have both higher productivity
growth and higher trade growth for reasons other than export access or import competition. I add
industry fixed effects to avoid using the cross-sectional variation and exploit the time-variation in trade
within industries instead. In the main specifications I also add firm level fixed effects (which absorb the
industry fixed effects) to control for firm characteristics that affect the productivity growth rate:
∆TFPist  β1∆IMPst   β3∆EXPst   yearFE  firmFE  νist (4.2)
All standard errors are clustered at the industry level, in the spirit of Bertrand et al. (2004).
Heterogeneous effects. Since Melitz (2003) the trade literature has focused on firm level heterogeneity.
In models with heterogeneous firms we do not expect all firms to be affected in the same way by import
competition and export opportunities. For example, import competition might affect firms with initially
lower productivity by more, because the threat of bankruptcy is stronger for them. On the other hand,
firms with already low productivity might be discouraged by import competition, and only firms with a
high enough productivity level to start with might even try to push the productivity frontier further out
to become productivity leader. Similarly, we should expect a heterogeneous response to a better access to
export markets. For example, the trade literature finds that usually only the most productive firms export.
In order to test for a heterogeneous response of firms depending on their initial productivity level
I interact changes in import competition and export access with TFP in the first year of the analysis (in
1993, denoted as TFP93i):
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∆TFPist  β1∆IMPst   β2 pTFP93i  ∆IMPstq
 β3∆EXPst   β4 pTFP93i  ∆EXPstq   yearFE  firmFE  ηit (4.3)
As robustness check I add industry*year specific fixed effects, which are collinear with the main effects
of import competition and export access, but still allow me to estimate the sign on the interaction terms,
β2 and β4.
Endogenous trade flows. A potential threat to identification is the endogeneity of industry level
imports and exports to the productivity of a firm (even though trade is measured at a more aggregated,
the industry, level). For example, there might be reverse causality: If firm productivity in a sector is
high, this might lead to fewer imports (e.g. due to Ricardian comparative advantage of Spain) and
more exports in that industry. Industry (or firm) level fixed effects in regression 4.1 avoid such cross-
sectional comparisons across industries with different productivity levels and focus on within industry
comparisons. However, even within industries reverse causality might hold over time: Imports are higher
and exports lower when sectoral TFP is lower. Regression 4.2 addresses some of this endogeneity concern
by using year fixed effects to absorb common time trends and industry (or firm) level fixed effects to look
only at deviations from the industry (firm) specific TFP growth rate.
If these sets of fixed effects cannot address the endogeneity problem fully, this would likely lead
us to underestimate the effect of import competition and overestimate the effect of access to export
markets. Many empirical trade papers use exogenous trade liberalization events and/or tariff reductions
to instrument for trade. Very often trade liberalization episodes lead to a bilateral reduction of tariffs,
therefore own tariff changes are usually highly correlated with tariff changes abroad. I will use the word
“import tariff” to refer to Spain’s tariffs, and “export tariff” to refer to import tariffs that foreign countries
impose on imports from Spain. The high correlation between import and export tariffs means that using
tariff changes as instruments will not solve the omitted variable bias problem in papers studying the
effect of only import competition or export access, as import tariff changes are not uncorrelated with
changes in exports and vice versa.
Any study focusing on the effects of export or imports on firms needs two instruments, one for
exports and one for imports. Futhermore, they cannot be too highly correlated. Econometrically, with
multiple endogenous regressors it is not sufficient for identification to have a significant first stage for
each endogenous regressor, because each first stage might use the same level of exogenous variation.
Instead, the matrix of first stages needs to be of full rank to ensure identification. The Kleibergen-Paap
statistics (Kleibergen and Paap 2006, implementation in Stata provided by Baum et al. 2010) provides a
rank test to check this.
I use the tariffs that the EU imposes on imports from the rest of the world and the tariffs that other
countries impose on imports from the EU as instruments for trade. More specifically, I use the maximum
tariff5 for each product category (ISIC Rev. 3; 244 product categories) and aggregate them to NACECLIO
industries using the import shares of each product within an industry and across countries. Empirically,
some tariff changes are more relevant for trade patterns than others, i.e. some are “binding” and inhibit
5Changes in the maximum tariff were empirically the changes with the most relevant impact on trade.
8
trade, whereas other tariff changes do not seem to be as relevant for trade. In order to use only binding
tariff changes which have an impact on trade flows (and therefore a strong first stage), I multiply the
weighted tariffs with an “importance weight” if tariff changes led to trade changes in the previous period.
The lagged importance weights are given by w  ∆tariff  ∆lnptradeq if w ¡ 0, and 0 otherwise.
It is not always clear whether tariff changes can be interpreted as exogenous to firms and industries,
as large companies often try to influence policy makers to negotiate favorable tariffs. However, in the
case of Spain tariffs are negotiated at the European level, and it is less likely that Spanish firms are able to
influence European decision making. Furthermore, many tariff changes are a part of a larger political
process, for example, EU enlargement, or China’s WTO accession, and therefore likely out of control for
specific Spanish firms.
Selection. There is a potential selection bias in the estimation above because some firms went bankrupt
during the sample period. It is plausible to assume that these firms exit because they have been hit hard
by a negative productivity shock. Omitting these firms from the sample and carrying out the estimation
on the surviving firms which experienced relatively more positive productivity shocks would lead to
an overestimation of the effect on productivity. This problem might be most severe for the productivity
estimation of the firms that have a very low productivity to begin with, because negative productivity
shocks are even more likely to cause bankruptcy for them.
The Spanish data set provides information about firm exits. It turns out that the number of exiting
firms is very small (between 0.1% and 2.5% per year), so it is unlikely that exits affect the estimates too
much in our case.6 In order to account for selection I assign exiting firms the lowest observed productivity
change in the exit year. The results are robust to this specification. I have also conducted a simple
alternative fix to this problem: using quantile instead of mean regressions. This is possible because
quantile regressions provide consistent estimates in the case of a censored dependent variable (assuming
that exiting firms have been hit by a very negative productivity effect), as long as exit rates are lower than
the estimated quantile (Angrist and Pischke 2009). It turns out that including or excluding exiting firms
in quantile regressions for various percentiles does not matter for the results, showing that selection is not
a concern in this paper.7
Robustness checks and other outcomes. In the remaining part of the paper I perform a variety
of robustness checks. For example, I show that the results are not sensitive to the way of measuring
6Note that while the data set allows me to distinguish between non responding and exiting firms, exiting firms include closed
firms, firms in liquidation, but also firms that are taken over by other firms. The last category of firms might not necessarily
have been hit by a negative productivity shock, if firms like to take over only targets that are very productive (“cherry picking”).
However, there is also evidence that take over targets are very unproductive (“lemon grabbing”), because they have a potential
of high returns after a successful turnaround (Weche Gelübcke 2013). In the cherry picking case, I might be underestimating the
true effect on productivity. In any case, note that the number of exiting firms is very small, and take overs are even rarer, so this
should not affect the results very much.
7The quantile estimation results are available upon request from the author. I pursued a censored quantile regression
approach as in Powell (1986) by assigning exiting firms the lowest observed productivity change in the exit year. The specific
quantile is identified if censoring is only on one side of the conditional percentile. Buchinsky (1994) proposes a estimation
algorithm to ensure this condition. The proposed estimation algorithm (which amounts to checking that the predicted values for
productivity changes for exiting firms are above the censored values) converges already in the first round in all of my estimations.
As in the mean regressions I would like to allow for firm and year fixed effects in the quantile regressions. However, estimating
quantile regressions with large number of fixed effects is tricky. For example, it is not valid to transform variables to deviations
from means, as the conditional quantile function is not linear. Estimating a large number of fixed effects is computationally very
intensive. Furthermore, a large number of fixed effects increase the variability of other estimates. In order to solve this problem,
I follow an approach suggested by Koenker (2004) using penalized quantile regression and sparse linear algebra.
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productivity. I also provide evidence that the import competition mechanism is not capturing an increased
access to imported inputs, and that increased export opportunities indeed lead to larger exports and a
higher propensity to exports at the firm level, without affecting output prices.
Furthermore, I show what type of activities Spanish firms undertake in order to increase productivity,
by looking at a large number of other variables such as R&D investment, patenting, product innovation,
adaptation of foreign technologies or implementation of other technologies. Finally, I use employment as
a dependent variable to check whether import competition and export opportunities have any or differing
effects on firm employment.
5 Main empirical results
Import competition versus export opportunities. Table 3 conducts a “horse race” between import
competition and access to export markets by estimating equation 4.2 to see whether either one affects
firm level productivity. Columns (1) and (2) regress productivity on import competition and export
access separately, and both regressions show a similar sized, significant effect of trade on productivity.
However, if including both measures in column (3), the coefficient on import competition falls and
becomes insignificant, showing that the regression in column (1) suffered from severe omitted variable
bias and captured the joint effect of both imports and exports. As imports and exports are usually highly
correlated, there is a substantial omitted variable bias in empirical studies focusing only on import
competition or export opportunities. A similar argument holds when comparing columns (2) and (3), but
the effect of export opportunities on productivity remains significant.
Adding industry fixed effects in column (4) and firm fixed effects in column (5) makes the difference
between import competition and export access even more pronounced. Access to export opportunities
has a strong and significant positive effect on firm level productivity. If exports increase by 10%, average
firm level productivity increases by 1.1%. On the other hand, import competition has a much smaller and
insignificant average effect. A regression focusing only on import competition is actually picking up the
effect of export opportunities. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no economic role of
import competition, as the average effect washes out heterogeneity in the response of firms.
Heterogeneous effects. Not all firms might react in the same way to increased import competition or
increased export opportunities. It might even be that the insignificant coefficient on import competition
hides a heterogeneous reaction that averages out. Table 4 therefore checks for heterogeneous effects
by adding interaction terms with the firm’s initial productivity level (in year 1993) as in equation 4.3.
An interesting pattern emerges in column (1): While the overall average effect of import competition is
positive but insignificant, the firms with the lowest initial productivity levels actually do increase their
productivity. This effect fades out as firms’ initial productivity increases. At the same time, while the
overall average effect of export opportunities is positive and significant, it turns out that it is really only
firms with an initially already high level of productivity that are driving these results. This should not
come as a surprise, as the trade literature on heterogeneous firms (e.g. Melitz 2003) predicts that only
firms with high productivity are exporting, and the empirical literature (e.g. Bernard et al. 2007) find that
exporting firms are usually the most productive firms in an industry.
This pattern is even more pronounced in column (2) which adds firm fixed effects. Column (3) adds
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industry*year fixed effects that absorb imports and exports as well as any difference across industries and
over time. However, the interaction effects can still be estimated and their coefficients are robust to this
inclusion.
In order to interpret the coefficients in Table 4, I plot the predicted change in productivity from import
competition and export opportunities by initial productivity for the observed sample of firms. Figure 4
uses my preferred specification in column (2) of Table 4 and shows that the average annual increase in
import competition (11.1%) leads firms with the lowest productivity level to increase their productivity
by 2.4%. The effect from export opportunities is even stronger, but only for the firms with the highest
productivity levels: The average annual increase in export opportunities (10.9%) makes highly productive
firms increase their productivity by 3.5%. Scaled up to the overall observed increase in trade over the 15
years in the sample, import competition could have been responsible for a 35% productivity increase for
low-TFP firms, and export opportunities could have been responsible for a 53% productivity increase for
high-TFP firms (Table 5).
Endogenous trade flows. If trade flows depend on the productivity growth in an industry, our
estimates might be biased. Therefore I use weighted import and export tariff changes (constructed as
described in section 4) as instruments for import competition and export opportunities in Table 6, and
the interaction of tariff changes with initial TFP as instruments for the interaction terms. Column (1)
repeats my preferred OLS specification in column (2) in Table 4, including both firm and year fixed effects.
Column (2) in Table 6 shows the instrumented version of that regression. The Kleibergen-Paap statistics
reported in the last row is 22.10, confirming a strong joint first stage. Table 7 reports the four first stages
associated with column (2). Import tariffs have a negative impact on imports, and the same is true for
exports, as expected. This relationship also holds for the interaction terms.
The magnitudes of the IV estimates is larger compared to the OLS results, pointing to measurement
error in imports and exports in the OLS regression.8 The effect of import competition is no longer
significant, but the effect of access to export markets remains significant. According to the IV estimates in
column (2), the average annual increase in export opportunities increased the productivity of high-TFP
firms by 9.8% (compared to 3.5% in the OLS estimation). Columns (3) and (4) add industry*year fixed
effects, omitting the main effects, but the findings in terms of the interaction terms are very similar.
Measurement of productivity. The results on access to export markets are not sensitive to the way
of measuring productivity. For example, in Table 8 I use labor productivity or TFP estimates obtained
via simple fixed effects regression (of sales on employment and capital including firm and year fixed
effects) as dependent variable, and the results are very similar. The results on import competition are
not significant across all specifications, but if anything it points again to firms with the lowest initial
productivity being affected the most.
Selection. As previously explained, we might still be overestimating the effect of trade on productivity
because there is a selection effect coming from the exits of unproductive firms. In order to include exiting
firms, I assign them the lowest observed productivity change tin a given industry and year, and include
these firms in the OLS and IV regressions in columns (5) and (6) of Table 6. As there are not very many
exiting firms, the sample increases by less than 2%. Figure 5 shows that exiting firms tend to have a
8It is not that surprising to find measurement error in export and imports. Other studies have found that trade flows reported
by the importing and exporting country often differ, and attribute this to misreporting.
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lower initial productivity as continuing firms, but there is still quite a wide dispersion, so assigning
them the lowest observed productivity change might be conservative. However, compared to the
regressions without exiting firms, the estimates remain largely unchanged. In the IV regressions, the
import competition effect becomes significant when including exiting firms.
Quantile regressions are robust to the precise value that is assigned to exiting firms, as long as the
share of exiting firms is smaller than the estimated quantile. Therefore I conducted a set of quantile
regressions with and without exiting firms.9 As there is little change in the estimated effects, selection
does not seem to be a major explanation for observed effects on productivity.
Overall, the regressions conducted so far have shown a very robust effect of access to export markets
on the productivity of firms, but only for firms that initially already had a high productivity. The effect of
import competition on productivity is weaker and not significant in all specifications. If anything, only
initially low productive firms increase their TFP because of import competition.10
Robustness checks. Are those firms who are induced by export opportunities to update their produc-
tivity also the ones who actually increase their exports or start to export? Otherwise I might be not be
capturing the right mechanism. To check this, column (1) in Table 9 uses firm level exports as dependent
variable in the IV regressions from before (IV specification as in column (2) of Table 6). It is reassuring
to see that the result is consistent with the export access mechanism and not picking up any spurious
correlation, as firm level exports increase in response to increased export opportunities (driven by tariff
changes), but only for the most productive firms. Column (2) uses the change in exporter status as a
dependent variable, and the pattern is similar. Access to export markets increase exports at both the
extensive and intensive margin. Column (3) checks whether the increase in exports is related to prices or
quantities by using the change in output prices as a dependent variable.11 However, there is no significant
change in output prices related to access to export markets. Note that the combined first stage is again
strong enough in all three regressions, as indicated by the large Kleibergen-Paap statistics.
Another concern is that increased imports might not be only a measure of import competition, but also
provide firms with the opportunity to use (potentially cheaper) imported goods as intermediate goods
which might be reflected in TFP. The used instrumental variable captures tariff changes at the output level
of an industry and should therefore not pick up variation in imports driven by inputs. However, tariff
changes for inputs and outputs of an industry might be correlated, and therefore the regression might
still pick up a change in imported inputs. Table 10 uses firm level imports as dependent variable in the
IV regressions to check this. Column (1) shows no significant change in firm level imports as response
to import competition. Column (2) uses the change in the probability to import as dependent variable,
and these results go into the opposite direction as the productivity results. Column (3) uses the change in
intermediate input prices as dependent variable.12 Again, the results go into the opposite direction as
the productivity results. Interestingly, these changes are also observed for firms who get access to export
9I conducted quantile regressions for the 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9 percentile; with and without interaction terms, and all
results were insensitive to the inclusion of exiting firms (because their number is quite small). The estimation results are available
upon request from the author.
10In earlier, unpublished work I found the same results using French firm level data. As this data set did not distinguish
between non-response and firm exits, I was unable to address the selection problem. However, it is reassuring that the results
seem to be general and hold across different countries and data sets.
11This variable refers to all products produced by a firm, not only for exported goods, which is not available in the survey.
12This variable refers to all inputs of a firm, not only imported goods, which is not available in the survey.
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markets. The most productive firms which upgrade their productivity as response to export opportunities
reduce imports and pay higher input prices which is the opposite of what we would expect to happen if
our measures are picking up a better access to imported inputs.
Ways to increase productivity. What do firms actually do to increase their productivity? Table 11
checks whether firms that are exposed to increased import competition or get access to export markets
engage in some activities that have the potential to increase TFP. Columns (1) and (2) show that firms
upgrade their productivity by increasing R&D expenses and starting to engage in R&D. Firms also
increase the number of patents and start to engage in patenting (columns (3) and (4)).13 Column (5) shows
that the firms also engage in product innovation, as they increase their number of products. For firms
with access to export markets this could mean that they adapt their products to foreign tastes or standards.
Firms under competition from abroad might be forced to develop new products in niches where they can
still be competitive, or to adapt their products to compete with foreign firms.
Every four years the survey contains additional questions about the use of specific technologies. These
technologies are the use of robots, computer aided design (CAD), and flexible manufacturing systems. As
these variables are only surveyed every four years, the sample size drops significantly, and the first stage
becomes too weak to use IV regressions. In column (6) I report therefore the OLS results of the adaptation
of the technology that had significant coefficients in the regressions: the use of CAD. However, CAD
is only used by productive firms that are exposed to export opportunities, and not by firms exposed to
import competition.
Trade liberalization is often believed to allow or induce domestic firms to adapt foreign, more efficient
technologies in order to stay competitive. In order to test this claim empirically, I check whether firms
make an effort to assimilate foreign technologies in their production process as a result of increased
trade. Column (7) finds that this is true, but only for the access to export markets channel, and only for
very productive firms. Interestingly, firms faced with increased import competition do not adapt foreign
technologies.
Implications for employment. There is strong evidence for the productivity enhancing effect of export
opportunities, and weak and heterogeneous evidence of the productivity enhancing effect of import
competition. Both channels might have different implications for employment: Import competition might
lead to labor-saving productivity increases, while access to export markets might lead to employment
growth. Table 12 uses employment as the dependent variable in IV regressions. Interestingly, neither
import competition nor access to export opportunities lead to significant employment changes. Note
that although exports and sales increase for high-TFP firms that are exposed to export opportunities,
labor productivity increases as well, leading to an insignificant net change in employment. However,
when taking a closer look by employment type, e.g. full-time and part-time employment as well as
temporary workers (who are not included in total employment), there is some evidence that low-TFP
firms induced by import competition to upgrade their productivity have increased their temporary staff
(potentially replacing full time workers, but the coefficient is not significant), whereas high-TFP firms
induced by export opportunities to increase their productivity increased their part time staff (again,
potentially replacing full time workers, but the coefficient is not significant). In any case, there is no
evidence that employment increased as a result of increased trade.
13The results are unchanged if I normalize the number of filed patents by employment.
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6 Model
This section provides a trade model that is consistent with the empirical findings: Access to export
markets induces already very productive firms to upgrade their productivity, whereas import competition
induces only firms with low initial productivity to increase their productivity.
While incorporating endogenous technology choice in a standard Melitz (2003) type trade model
yields the prediction about export access (e.g. Bustos 2011; Melitz and Costantini 2007; Lileeva and Trefler
2010), including the “import competition” mechanism is more difficult. Standard CES preferences result
in constant markups and therefore there is no role for import competition. With alternative preferences
it is possible to show that trade liberalization has pro-competitive effects as it reduces markups (e.g.
quasilinear preferences as in Melitz and Ottaviano 2008; translog preferences as in Feenstra 2003; CARA
utility as in Behrens and Murata 2007; or decreasing relative love for variety as in Zhelobodko et al.
2011). However, in this case endogenous technology choice does not provide an incentive for the initially
least innovative firms to upgrade, but the opposite. In order words, if low productive firms would have
wanted to increase their productivity, they would have done so even before trade liberalization.
One possibility to generate the behavior observed in the data is to introduce non-profit maximizing
managers, as in Aghion et al. (1999). Managers innovate in order to reduce the risk of bankruptcy
following increased competition. In this paper I apply this idea as follows: Managers get a constant salary
if the firm exists and therefore face a discontinuous cost when the firm goes bankrupt. I incorporate
this idea into a Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) which is extended to allow for endogenous productivity
upgrades.
Demand. There are L consumers with quasilinear preferences over a continuum of differentiated
varieties qCi , i P Ω, and a homogeneous good qC0 :
U  qC0   α
»
iPΩ
qCi di
1
2
γ
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
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	2
di 1
2
η
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The inverse demand curve for each variety i is then
qi ppiq  L
γ
pα ηQ piq with Q 
»
iPΩ
qCi di
Demand is positive as long as prices are not too high, i.e. pi   α ηQ.
Q reflects the degree of competition, as it is an increasing function of the number of firms N and a
decreasing function of average prices of products that have positive demand (subset Ω  Ω):
Q  N pα p¯q
γ  ηN with p¯ 
1
N
»
iPΩ
pi di
Technology. After paying a sunk entry cost fe, firms draw their initial productivity (marginal cost ci)
from a Pareto distribution Gpcq 

c
cM
	k
. Firms are run by managers who can spend effort in order to
decrease the initial marginal cost, i.e. increase the firm’s productivity. The cost of effort to the manager
depends on the achieved change in cost ψ and is given by the increasing, convex function f pψq  12ψ2.
A numeraire good is produced under perfect competition with a unit labor input requirement which
pins down wages to equal 1. The gross profits of the firm are given by revenue net of production cost
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(subscript i omitted for simplicity):
pipc,ψq  pqppq  pc ψqqppq
Managers. Managers receive a fixed salary s plus a share β of gross profits unless the firm is bankrupt.
A firm goes bankrupt if its net profit, i.e. the profit after paying the bonus and salary to the manager,
becomes negative.The utility of managers is given by
UM 
$&
%s  βpi pψq  f pψq if p1 βqpi pψq  s ¥ 00 if p1 βqpi pψq  s   0
Managers have to decide how much effort to spend in order to upgrade productivity.
Closed economy equilibrium. Firms face monopolistic competition and therefore prices are set at14
ppc,ψq  1
2
pα ηQ  c ψq
Gross profits are therefore
pipc,ψq  L
4γ
pα ηQ c  ψq2
In the appendix I show that if 2γ βL ¡ 0, optimal effort as a function of the initial cost draw is given by
the following function:15
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The optimal effort function is illustrated in Figure 6. If a firm’s initial cost draw is below cL, a manager
spends effort in order to equalize the marginal benefit of an increase in profits to the marginal cost
of exerting effort. Since profits are convex in the initial cost draw, the lower the initial cost draw, the
higher the benefits from reducing it even further. Therefore managers’ effort is higher at a low cost draw
compared to a higher cost draw, i.e. the effort function ψLpcq is decreasing in the cost draw.16
14Note that managers will get a share of profits, therefore the incentives of the firm and the manager are aligned for price
setting.
15Note that if 2γ βL   0, quantities are not positive at any cost draw.
16Since firm’s cost cannot become negative, there is a limit to the cost reduction that can be achieved by a manager. This means
for firms with a very low cost draw, the managers effort will actually fall again. However, as this is only relevant for very small
initial cost draws, this case is excluded from the analysis.
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Once the initial cost draw is too high for the firm to be profitable, c ¡ cL, a manager increases his
effort to reduce cost in order to make sure that the firm does not go bankrupt, because the manager wants
to receive her salary. The higher the initial cost draw, the more effort managers need to spend in order
to ensure survival: ψUpcq is increasing. Managers exert effort until the initial cost draw is too high and
the salary cannot compensate the manager anymore for the extra effort required to reduce cost. At this
point, if c ¡ cU , managers’ utility would be negative and the manager lets the firm exit. Note that the
distribution of firms with respect to final productivity, i.e. productivity after endogenous upgrading, has
a bunching point at the lowest cost cutoff cL.
Perfect trade integration. For simplicity consider first the case in which there are no trade cost and
countries are perfectly integrated. Comparing the open economy to the closed economy then amounts to
analyzing an increase in market size L. In Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) trade liberalization has two effects:
A market size effect, which results in an increase in profits for the most productive firms. At the same
time, the increase in profits induces more firms to enter, which lowers markups and average prices. As a
result the zero cost cutoff falls and firms exit, which is the import competition effect.
Here I distinguish between the two effects and consider the impact of either a reduction in the cost
cutoff cL (import competition effect, holding market access constant17) or an increase in L (export access
effect, holding the cost cutoff constant) on the optimal effort function for the least and most productive
firms.
Consider first the import competition effect: If the cost cutoff falls, managers at the old cost cutoff and
below will spend more effort in order to keep the firm from bankruptcy and secure their salary (unless
this is too costly for them which results in increased exits of the least productive firms). The market
access effect results in an increase in profits which induces managers to spend more effort. The lower the
initial cost draw, the more productive is the firm, and the larger the increase in profits and therefore the
incentive for managers to upgrade productivity.
Figure 7 illustrates the change in the effort function of managers. In the appendix I show analytically
how the effort function changes.
Trade liberalization with positive trade cost. Assume that there are two symmetric countries. Firms
can export goods to the foreign country after paying a variable transport cost τ ¡ 1. Firms export if profits
from exporting are positive:
piX  pqppq  τpc ψqqppq  L4γ pα ηQ τ pc ψqq
2 ¡ 0
Firm gross profits comprise of profits from domestic sales and profits from exporting:
pipc,ψq  L
4γ
pα ηQ c  ψq2   L
4γ
pα ηQ τ pc ψqq2 1X
where 1X denotes whether the firm exports or not.
Managers choose their effort in order to maximize utility
17Note that in contrast to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), trade liberalization does not necessarily result in a reduction of the
cost cutoff, the effect is ambiguous. While larger markets increase profits inducing a larger number of entrants and therefore
reducing the cost cutoff, larger profits also makes it possible for less efficient firms to cover the fixed salary of a manager, thus
increasing the cost cutoff. In this model I define the import competition effect as a reduction of the cost cutoff.
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such that firms’ net profits are positive:
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Denote the initial cost draw below which firms export as cX. If the initial cost draw is higher, only
domestic sales are relevant, and optimal effort functions are as before (note though that Q is different,
as it reflects the number of firms and average price levels). In the appendix I derive the optimal effort
function when the firm exports. Overall, the optimal effort function is given by
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Figure 8 illustrates the change in the effort function. Trade liberalization has again two effects:
Productive firms have the opportunity to generate additional profits by exporting. The marginal benefit
from exerting effort is larger for firm with lower cost draws, as profits from exporting are larger. Managers
with a low initial cost draw will therefore spend more effort, this is the “access to export market” channel.
Due to increased import competition, the cost cutoff point cL above which a firm has zero profits falls.
Because of the convexity in the payoff function of managers due to the fixed salary, some managers with
high cost draws will now find it optimal to increase effort to ensure survival of the firm. TIn the appendix
I show formally how both channels affect firms differentially.
7 Conclusions
Trade liberalization affects firms in several ways: One the one hand, firms get access to new export
markets, providing them with an opportunity for growth. On the other hand, foreign firms enter the
home market and create more competition for domestic firms. Both of these two “faces” of globalization
might induce firms to upgrade their productivity. Increased export opportunities can make it worthwhile
for firms to invest in new technology, while increased competitive pressure from foreign companies might
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force firms to engage in innovation in order to avoid bankruptcy or retain monopoly rents.
Existing papers have mostly focused on the productivity inducing effect of either export access or
import competition. However, usually imports and exports are highly correlated (even within narrowly
defined industries), and it is not clear whether empirical papers are picking up the right mechanism, or
whether they suffer from omitted variable bias.
This paper disentangles the the two channels. The results suggest that empirical papers focusing
on import competition pick up the effect of access to export markets by omitting this variable. On
average, the impact of export opportunities on productivity is large and significant, while the impact of
import competition is small and insignificant. This highlights that papers studying the effects of import
competition or access to export markets need to control for the other channel in order to eliminate omitted
variable bias. Furthermore, in order to deal with the endogeneity of imports and exports, it is necessary
to find two instrumental variables, one for each trade direction. Trade liberalization episodes usually
affect tariffs of both the importing and exporting country, making them highly correlated. It is therefore
not sufficient to instrument for only exports or imports. The two instruments need to be sufficiently
uncorrelated such that the matrix of first stages is full rank, so papers need to report the Kleibergen-Paap
statistics on top of checking the F-statistics on each first stage separately.
Furthermore, there is a large heterogeneity in both the effects of export access and import competi-
tion, depending on the initial productivity of firms: Only already very productive firms update their
productivity when subject to new export opportunities. The evidence on import competition is weaker,
with possibly initially low-tech firms managing to increase their productivity in response to increased
competition from abroad. The latter result is surprising, as standard trade models predict the opposite.
I therefore provide a trade model that is consistent with the empirical findings, by adding non-profit
maximizing managers to a Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model extended to an endogenous productivity
choice. Managers receive a fixed salary if the firm exists, which introduces convexity in their payoff
function. As a result, increased import competition induces those managers to upgrade productivity by
more.
Productivity upgrades are driven by increased R&D, patenting, and product innovation. Access to
export markets induces the adaptation of foreign technologies for the most productive firms. There is no
evidence that either mechanism leads to increased full time employment, instead full time workers seem
to be replaced by part-time or temporary workers, which is probably disappointing for policy makers.
Growth in firm size seems to be offset by increase in (labor saving) productivity, leveling out the effect on
employment.
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Appendix
A Figures
Figure 1: Spain’s world trade over time
Source: United Nations COMTRADE database, accessed by World Integrated Trade
Solution (WITS), wits.worldbank.org
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Figure 2: Spain’s trade by country over time
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Figure 3: Spain’s trade by industry over time
Source: United Nations COMTRADE database, accessed by World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), wits.worldbank.org
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Figure 4: Estimated effect of import competition and export access on productivity growth of firms, by
firms’ initial productivity
Notes: The average annual increase in trade is 11.1% for imports and 10.9% for exports
over the observed sample period between 1993 and 2007. The shaded areas represent the
90% confidence interval of the estimates.
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Figure 5: TFP distribution of all firms and exiting firms
Notes: The graph shows the kernel density of ln(TFP) in 1993 for all firms that exist in 1993 and
separately for the subset of firms that exit at some later point in time. TFP is estimated by Levinsohn-
Petrin method, adjusted for changes in input and output prices.
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Figure 6: Manager’s compensation and incentive to increase productivity before trade liberalization.
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Figure 7: Effect of perfect trade integration on productivity upgrades
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Figure 8: Effect of trade liberalization with positive trade cost on productivity upgrades
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A Tables
Table 1: Top 3 import origins by industry
Industry Country
import share 
1993 Country
import share 
2007 Industry Country
import share 
1993 Country
import share 
2007
Total trade France 17% Germany 16%
Germany 15% France 13%
Italy 8% Italy 8%
Meat related products France 24% France 21% Nonmetal mineral products France 20% China 21%
Netherlands 15% Germany 15% Germany 13% Portugal 15%
United Kingdom 10% Netherlands 15% Italy 13% Italy 13%
Food and tobacco France 21% France 16% Basic metal products France 27% France 17%
Netherlands 9% Germany 11% Germany 17% Germany 10%
Germany 7% Argentina 8% United Kingdom 14% China 9%
Beverage United Kingdom 53% United Kingdom 32% Fabricated metal products Germany 25% Germany 22%
Netherlands 11% France 12% Italy 20% Italy 17%
France 10% Italy 8% France 19% France 14%
Textiles and clothing Italy 19% China 22% Industrial and agricultural equipment Germany 24% Germany 22%
France 11% Italy 13% Italy 21% Italy 19%
China 9% Turkey 8% France 14% France 11%
Leather, fur and footwear Italy 22% China 35% Computer products, electronics and opticalUnited States 17% Netherlands 16%
China 15% Italy 15% Germany 14% Germany 16%
Korea, Rep. 7% Vietnam 8% France 13% China 12%
Timber United States 17% Portugal 13% Electric materials and accessories Germany 19% Germany 19%
Portugal 16% France 10% France 14% China 15%
France 12% China 10% Japan 12% France 9%
Paper Finland 20% France 20% Vehicles and accessories France 31% Germany 34%
France 16% Finland 14% Germany 30% France 24%
Germany 13% Germany 14% United Kingdom 8% Italy 7%
Printing and publishing United Kingdom 19% United Kingdom 20% Other transportation materials United States 47% France 21%
Germany 17% Germany 16% Italy 10% United States 20%
Italy 12% China 11% Japan 8% United Kingdom 12%
Chemicals Germany 20% Germany 17% Furniture Italy 22% China 20%
France 17% France 14% France 20% Italy 14%
United Kingdom 9% United States 8% Germany 18% Germany 14%
Plastic and rubber products France 27% Germany 20% Games & toys, sports instr China 20% China 22%
Germany 23% Italy 16% Italy 14% Germany 16%
Italy 14% France 16% Japan 12% United Kingdom 15%
Note: Countries with the largest change are shaded.
Table 2: Top 3 export destinations by industry
Industry Country
export share 
1993 Country
export share 
2007 Industry Country
export share 
1993 Country
export share 
2007
Total trade France 19% France 20%
Germany 15% Germany 11%
Italy 9% Italy 9%
Meat related products France 32% France 29% Nonmetal mineral products France 16% France 19%
Portugal 19% Portugal 20% Germany 12% Portugal 10%
Germany 12% Germany 10% United States 11% United Kingdom 8%
Food and tobacco Italy 16% France 19% Basic metal products France 12% France 15%
France 14% Italy 18% Germany 10% Italy 15%
Portugal 10% Portugal 15% China 8% Germany 15%
Beverage Germany 17% United Kingdom 14% Fabricated metal products France 17% France 21%
United Kingdom 14% Germany 14% Germany 13% Germany 13%
France 10% France 9% Portugal 8% Portugal 12%
Textiles and clothing France 15% Portugal 15% Industrial and agricultural equipment France 15% France 12%
Portugal 14% France 13% Germany 12% Germany 11%
Italy 11% Italy 9% Portugal 7% Portugal 8%
Leather, fur and footwear Germany 19% France 20% Computer products, electronics and opticalGermany 23% Portugal 20%
United States 17% Portugal 10% France 12% France 10%
France 15% Italy 9% Italy 9% Germany 9%
Timber France 21% France 20% Electric materials and accessories Germany 19% France 14%
Portugal 15% Portugal 20% France 15% Germany 13%
United Kingdom 10% United States 9% Portugal 6% Italy 9%
Paper France 21% France 22% Vehicles and accessories France 31% France 32%
Portugal 16% Portugal 18% Germany 21% Germany 14%
Germany 12% Italy 9% Italy 14% United Kingdom 11%
Printing and publishing Argentina 14% France 23% Other transportation materials France 12% France 14%
Mexico 13% Portugal 12% Liberia 11% United Kingdom 10%
France 12% Mexico 11% Norway 11% United States 9%
Chemicals France 13% Italy 13% Furniture France 26% France 30%
Germany 12% France 12% Germany 15% Portugal 13%
Italy 10% Germany 11% Portugal 11% United Kingdom 6%
Plastic and rubber products France 23% France 23% Games & toys, sports instr France 20% France 19%
Germany 15% Germany 13% Germany 9% Portugal 17%
Portugal 9% Portugal 11% Portugal 9% United States 8%
Note: Countries with the largest change are shaded.
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Table 3: Import competition versus access to export markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ∆ ln pTFPq ∆ ln pTFPq ∆ ln pTFPq ∆ ln pTFPq ∆ ln pTFPq
∆ ln pIMPq 0.094* 0.065 0.035 0.015
(0.049) (0.047) (0.052) (0.053)
∆ ln pEXPq 0.096*** 0.065** 0.085*** 0.106***
(0.034) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
Observations 14,027 14,027 14,027 14,027 13,892
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES
Firm fixed effects YES
Notes: The dependent variable ∆ ln pTFPq denotes the change in log TFP (estimated by Levinsohn-
Petrin method, adjusted for changes in input and output prices). The main regressors are ∆ ln pIMPq
measuring the change in log of Spain’s world imports, and ∆ ln pEXPq measuring the change in log
of Spain’s world exports, both at the NACECLIO industry level. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by NACECLIO industries.
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Table 4: Heterogeneous effects
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ∆ ln pTFPq ∆ ln pTFPq ∆ ln pTFPq
∆ ln IMP 0.385** 0.572**
(0.195) (0.238)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q -0.026 -0.040** -0.026*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014)
∆ ln EXP -0.521*** -0.493***
(0.198) (0.188)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.026*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 14,027 13,892 13,892
Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.001
Year fixed effects YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES
Firm fixed effects YES YES
Industry*year fixed effects YES
Notes: The dependent variable ∆ ln pTFPq denotes the change in log TFP (estimated
by Levinsohn-Petrin method, adjusted for changes in input and output prices). The
main regressors are ∆ ln IMP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world imports, and
∆ ln EXP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world exports, both at the NACECLIO
industry level. Both main effects are interacted with the log of a firm’s initial productivity
in year 1993, ln pTFP93q. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by NACECLIO industries.
Table 5: Estimated effect of import competition and export opportunities on productivity growth of firms,
by firms’ initial productivity
% increase in trade
11% 160%
% change in TFP 1% (average annual) (1993-2007)
Import competition:
Firms with lowest observed TFP 0.21% 2.36% 35.46%
Firms with highest observed TFP -0.19% -2.10% -31.4%
Export opportunities:
Firms with lowest observed TFP -0.11% -1.16% -17.36%
Firms with highest observed TFP 0.32% 3.54% 53.05%
Notes: The predicted changes are calculated based on column (2) of Table 4.
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Table 6: Tariff changes as instrumental variables
DEPENDENT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLE: ∆ ln pTFPq OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
∆ ln IMP 0.572** 1.448 0.564** 1.634*
(0.238) (1.007) (0.253) (0.846)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q -0.040** -0.106 -0.026* -0.0947 -0.0399** -0.130**
(0.017) (0.068) (0.014) (0.0616) (0.0184) (0.0602)
∆ ln EXP -0.493*** -2.711*** -0.376 -2.973***
(0.188) (0.753) (0.247) (0.699)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.043*** 0.190*** 0.026* 0.179*** 0.0367** 0.215***
(0.014) (0.049) (0.015) (0.0512) (0.0176) (0.0436)
Observations 13,892 13,892 13,892 13,892 14,178 14,178
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Industry*year fixed effects YES YES
Including exiting firms YES YES
First stage Kleibergen-Paap statistics 22.10 22.24 20.45
Notes: The dependent variable ∆ ln pTFPq denotes the change in log TFP (estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin method, adjusted for
changes in input and output prices). The main regressors are ∆ ln IMP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world imports,
and ∆ ln EXP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world exports, both at the NACECLIO industry level. Both main effects
are interacted with the log of a firm’s initial productivity in year 1993, ln pTFP93q. Columns (2), (4) and (6) use weighted tariff
changes (multiplied by importance weights) as described in the text as instrumental variables for import competition and export
access, and their interactions with initial productivity as instrumental variables for the interaction terms. Columns (5) and (6)
include exiting firms and assigns them the lowest observed productivity change in their exiting year in their industry. * p 0.05,
** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by NACECLIO industries.
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Table 7: First stages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p∆ ln IMPq  p∆ ln EXPq 
VARIABLES ∆ ln IMP ln pTFP93q ∆ ln EXP ln pTFP93q
∆IMPTAR -2.733 4.563 -1.538 18.457
(1.693) (32.088) (1.188) (24.868)
p∆IMPTARq  ln pTFP93q 0.044 -2.386 -0.010 -2.948
(0.098) (2.155) (0.072) (1.899)
∆EXPTAR -0.000 0.013 -0.006* 0.025
(0.003) (0.033) (0.003) (0.038)
p∆EXPTARq  ln pTFP93q -0.000 -0.003* -0.000 -0.009***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Observations 13,892 13,892 13,892 13,892
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: This Table shows the four first stages of the IV regression in column (2) in Table 6. ∆IMPTAR and ∆EXPTAR
are weighted tariff changes (multiplied by importance weights) as described in the text and used as instrumental
variables for import competition and export access, and their interactions with initial productivity are used as
instrumental variables for the interaction terms. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by NACECLIO industries.
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Table 8: Alternative measures for productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Levinsohn-Petrin Labor productivity Fixed effects
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
∆ ln IMP 0.572** 1.448 -0.0374 4.937** 0.283 6.683**
(0.238) (1.007) (0.661) (2.342) (0.482) (2.855)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q -0.040** -0.106 0.00495 -0.448** -0.0205 -0.579**
(0.017) (0.068) (0.0566) (0.210) (0.0400) (0.249)
∆ ln EXP -0.493*** -2.711*** -0.781** -3.652* -1.006*** -6.922***
(0.188) (0.753) (0.376) (2.023) (0.263) (2.432)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.043*** 0.190*** 0.0830** 0.334* 0.0989*** 0.595***
(0.014) (0.049) (0.0339) (0.172) (0.0239) (0.203)
Observations 13,892 13,892 15,100 15,100 14,134 14,134
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
First stage Kleibergen-Paap statistics 22.10 23.11 26.26
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) replicate the specifications in columns (1) and (2) in Table 6, using the change in log TFP estimated
by Levinsohn-Petrin method, adjusted for changes in input and output prices as dependent variable. Columns (3) and (4) use
changes in log of labor productivity as dependent variable, where labor productivity is defined as total sales divided by total
employment. Columns (5) and (6) use changes in log of TFP estimated by an OLS regression of sales on employment and capital,
including firm and year fixed effects.
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Table 9: Firm level exports
(1) (2) (3)
Change in Change in Change in
VARIABLES ln(firm level exports) exporter status output price
∆ ln IMP 13.76 0.815 180.2
(12.76) (1.440) (163.8)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q -0.915 -0.0209 -9.775
(0.778) (0.113) (10.93)
∆ ln EXP -6.220 -2.864*** -30.35
(3.790) (0.642) (48.71)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.463** 0.163*** 1.380
(0.216) (0.0400) (3.124)
Observations 7,809 12,578 23,329
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
First stage Kleibergen-Paap statistics 12.12 34.44 19.16
Notes: The dependent variables are the change in log of firm level exports in column (1), change in exporter dummy variable in
column (2) and percentage change in output prices (weighted average across all outputs) in column (3). The main regressors are
∆ ln IMP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world imports, and ∆ ln EXP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world
exports, both at the NACECLIO industry level. Both main effects are interacted with the log of a firm’s initial productivity in year
1993, ln pTFP93q. All regressions use tariff changes (multiplied by importance weights) as described in the text as instrumental
variables for import competition and export access, and their interactions with initial productivity as instrumental variables for
the interaction terms. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by NACECLIO industries.
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Table 10: Imported inputs versus import competition
(1) (2) (3)
Change in Change in Change in
VARIABLES ln(firm level imports) importer status input price
∆ ln IMP -31.61 -4.353** 199.6*
(27.99) (1.692) (109.4)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q 2.255 0.282** -13.30*
(1.936) (0.120) (7.236)
∆ ln EXP 34.48*** 6.101*** -41.27
(9.857) (0.982) (28.22)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q -2.349*** -0.389*** 3.135*
(0.678) (0.0641) (1.801)
Observations 7,646 12,502 23,291
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
First stage Kleibergen-Paap statistics 36.38 33.17 19.01
Notes: The dependent variables are the change in log of firm level imports in column (1), change in importer dummy variable in
column (2) and percentage change in input prices (weighted average across all inputs) in column (3). The main regressors are
∆ ln IMP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world imports, and ∆ ln EXP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world
exports, both at the NACECLIO industry level. Both main effects are interacted with the log of a firm’s initial productivity in year
1993, ln pTFP93q. All regressions use tariff changes (multiplied by importance weights) as described in the text as instrumental
variables for import competition and export access, and their interactions with initial productivity as instrumental variables for
the interaction terms. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by NACECLIO industries.
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Table 11: Ways to increase productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Change in Change in Change in Assimilate
R&D patenting CAD imported
VARIABLES ∆ ln R&D dummy ∆#patents dummy ∆#products dummy technology
∆ ln IMP 20.08** 3.822** 233.1* -2.675** 5.918* 0.444 0.680
(10.14) (1.847) (134.7) (1.162) (3.434) (0.355) (0.497)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q -1.167* -0.207** -17.78* 2.035*** -0.397* -0.0298 -0.0550
(0.685) (0.0995) (9.916) (0.290) (0.233) (0.0250) (0.0371)
∆ ln EXP -9.625*** -4.812*** -347.4*** -0.127*** -7.505*** -0.880*** -0.774*
(3.528) (1.005) (57.45) (0.0210) (1.412) (0.338) (0.439)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.468** 0.284*** 26.06*** 0.174** 0.486*** 0.0635** 0.0594*
(0.235) (0.0631) (4.242) (0.0844) (0.0909) (0.0248) (0.0340)
Observations 4,292 12,491 12,582 21,797 12,523 2,516 2,562
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
First stage Kleibergen- 17.58 33.34 34.92 21.05 33.07
Paap statistics
Notes: The dependent variables are the change in log of total R&D expenditures (internal and external) in column (1), change
in R&D dummy variable in column (2), change in number of patents in column (3), change in patenting dummy in column
(4), change in number of products in column (5), change in dummy variable indicating whether the firm used computer aided
design (CAD) in column (6), and change in a dummy variable to indicate whether a firm spent effort to assimilate imported
technologies in column (7). The latter two variables are only asked every 4 years in the survey. The main regressors are ∆ ln IMP
measuring the change in log of Spain’s world imports, and ∆ ln EXP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world exports,
both at the NACECLIO industry level. Both main effects are interacted with the log of a firm’s initial productivity in year 1993,
ln pTFP93q. Regressions (1) to (5) use tariff changes (multiplied by importance weights) as described in the text as instrumental
variables for import competition and export access, and their interactions with initial productivity as instrumental variables for
the interaction terms. Columns (6) and (7) are estimated via OLS (the first stage was too weak for IV estimation because of the
reduced number of observations). * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by NACECLIO
industries.
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Table 12: Implications for employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆ ln EMPL ∆ ln FULLTIME ∆ ln PARTTIME ∆ ln TEMP
∆ ln IMP -1.789 -4.416 0.229 11.19*
(2.514) (2.728) (8.186) (6.309)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q 0.144 0.302 0.0377 -0.678
(0.189) (0.194) (0.609) (0.458)
∆ ln EXP -1.372 1.641 -11.09** -13.28
(1.070) (1.215) (4.619) (10.83)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.0891 -0.106 0.768** 0.814
(0.0755) (0.0824) (0.312) (0.754)
Observations 12,635 12,555 2,548 8,931
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
First stage Kleibergen-Paap statistics 34.98 34.95 28.73 36.86
Notes: The dependent variables are the change in log of firm level employment (excluding temporary workers) in column (1),
change in log of firm level full time employment (excluding temporary workers) in column (2), change in log of firm level
part time employment (excluding temporary workers) in column (3), and change in log of firm level temporary workers in
column (4). The main regressors are ∆ ln IMP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world imports, and ∆ ln EXP measuring
the change in log of Spain’s world exports, both at the NACECLIO industry level. Both main effects are interacted with the log
of a firm’s initial productivity in year 1993, ln pTFP93q. All regressions use tariff changes (multiplied by importance weights)
as described in the text as instrumental variables for import competition and export access, and their interactions with initial
productivity as instrumental variables for the interaction terms. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by NACECLIO industries.
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B Proofs
B.1 Optimal effort function and cost cutoffs in closed economy
For a given cost draw c, managers choose effort in order to maximize their utility such that firm’s net
profits are positive.
max
ψ
s  β L
4γ
pα ηQ c  ψq2  1
2
ψ2
s.t.
p1 βqpi pψq  s ¥ 0
UM ¥ 0
The Lagrangian is
Lpψq  s  β L
4γ
pα ηQ c  ψq2  1
2
ψ2  λ

s p1 βq L
4γ
pα ηQ c  ψq2


The first order conditions are
B
Bψ 
βL
2γ
pα ηQ c  ψq  ψ  λ p1 βq L
2γ
pα ηQ c  ψq  0 (B.1)
λ

s p1 βq L
4γ
pα ηQ c  ψq2


 0
λ ¥ 0
p1 βq L
4γ
pα ηQ c  ψq2  s ¥ 0
Case 1. The constraint is not binding, λ  0. In this case the firm makes positive profits. Rearrange
the first order condition B.1 for the optimal effort function ψL:
ψL pcq  βL2γ βL pα ηQ cq
This case holds for initial cost draws such that firm (net) profits are positive:
piFpcq  p1 βqpi pc,ψLq  s ¥ 0
c ¤ α ηQ p2γ βLq
?
sa
γ p1 βq L : cL
Get an expression for quantities plugging in prices and the optimal effort function:
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q ppq  L
γ
pα ηQ pq  L
2γ βL pα ηQ cq
Assume 2γ βL ¡ 0 which ensures that there are positive quantities at some initial cost draw.
Case 2. The constraint is binding, λ ¡ 0. In this case the manager will just put in enough effort to
make the firm break even. Therefore firm’s profits are zero
s p1 βq L
4γ
pα ηQ c  ψq2  0
Rearranging yields optimal effort ψU :
ψU pcq 
c
s
1 β
c
4γ
L
 α  ηQ  c
The Lagrange multiplier λ can be derived from the first order condition B.1:
λ 
c
γ
L p1 βq s pc α  ηQq 
β
1 β  
2γ
p1 βq L
Since λ ¡ 0 this gives the cutoff condition for the initial cost draw cL.
c ¡ α ηQ p2γ βLq
?
sa
γ p1 βq L  cL
If the initial cost draw is too high, c ¡ cU , the utility of managers becomes negative. Setting the
manager’s utility to zero using optimal effort ψU and solving for c yields the cost cutoff cU :
UM  s  β L
4γ
pα ηQ cU   ψUq2  12ψ
2
U  0
α ηQ cU 
c
sγ
p1 βqL 
d
sL
2p1 βqL
Since the utility function of managers is concave, the larger of the two roots is the relevant cutoff:
cU : α ηQ
c
sγ
p1 βqL 
d
sL
2p1 βqL

 α ηQ
c
s
p1 βqL

?
γ
c
L
2

Note that ψLpcq is falling in c, while ψUpcq is increasing in c. At the cost cutoff beyond which firms
make no profits cL (constraint is binding, case 1), the effort function has a kink:
ψLpcLq  ψUpcLq  β
?
Lsa
γp1 βq
B.2 Impact of trade liberalization with zero trade cost
Import competition. Suppose the cost cutoff falls from cAL (A denotes autarky) to c
O
L (O denotes open
economy). To see that a reduction in the cost cutoff results in more effort of firms with initial cost draw cAL
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, consider that
ψAU

cAL
	
 β
?
sLa
γ p1 βq  
β
?
sLa
γ p1 βq   c
A
L  cOL  ψOU

cAL
	
because cAL ¡ cOL . Plugging in the expression for cOL shows that the right hand side is equal to the new
effort.
For cAL   c   cOU , effort also increases:
ψAU pcq  ψAU

cAL
	
  c cAL   ψOU

cAL
	
  c cAL  ψOUpcq
Firms with high cost, c ¡ cOU , exit.
Export access. If market size L increases (holding cost cutoff cL constant), the optimal effort for
productive firms, i.e. firms with positive profits, increases:
BψL
BL 
β
?
s 1
2
?
La
γ p1 βq   pcL  cq
β p2γ βLq   β2L
p2γ βLq2 
β
?
s
2
a
γL p1 βq   pcL  cq
2βγ
p2γ βLq2 ¡ 0
This increase is higher the lower the initial cost draw c:
B2ψL
BLBc  
2βγ
p2γ βLq2   0
B.3 Optimal effort function and cost cutoffs in open economy with positive trade cost
If firms are only selling in the domestic markets, managers exert the same effort as before (although Q is
different, as it captures the increased number of firms and the reduced average prices). Therefore we have
ψLpcq  βL2γ βL pα ηQ cq if c   cL  α ηQ
p2γ βLq?sa
γ p1 βq L
ψUpcq 
d
4γs
p1 βq L  α  ηQ  c if c   cU  α ηQ
c
s
p1 βqL

?
γ
c
L
2

The effort at cL is as before
ψLpcLq  ψUpcLq  β
?
Lsa
γp1 βq
However, if cost are low enough, firms start to export. The cost threshold for exporting is therefore
such that export profits become positive after exerting effort ψL:
cX  ψL  α ηQ
τ
cX  2γ βL  τβL2γτ pα ηQq
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Assume that cX   cL, i.e. that there are firms selling only to the domestic market. Note that unlike in
Melitz and Ottaviano 2008 this is not guaranteed by the variable trade cost τ ¡ 1, as it is not sufficient to
have positive domestic profits to enter; domestic profits have to be large enough to cover the salary of
managers.
The manager chooses effort in order to maximize profits from the domestic and export market:
max
ψ
s  β L
4γ
pα ηQ c  ψq2   β L
4γ
pα ηQ τ pc ψqq2  1
2
ψ2
The first order condition with respect to effort if the firm is exporting is:
βL
2γ
pα ηQ c  ψq   βL
2γ
pα ηQ τ pc ψqq  ψ
and can be solved for optimal effort if exporting, ψX:
ψXpcq  βL2γ βL p1  τq p2 pα ηQq  c p1  τqq
At cX, the effort function has a kink, but does not jump, as ψXpcXq  ψLpcXq:
ψXpcXq  βL pα ηQq2γ βL p1  τq

4γτ p2γ βL  τβLq p1  τq
2γτ


 βL pα ηQq
2γ βL

2γτ p2γ βL  τβLq
2γτ


 ψLpcXq
B.4 Impact of trade liberalization with positive variable trade cost
Again I consider the effect of a reduction in the zero profit cost cutoff cL (import competition), and the
possibility to generate profits from export markets (export access) on the optimal effort function.
Import competition. If the cost cutoff falls from cAL (A denotes autarky) to c
O
L (O denotes open
economy), managers at the old cost cutoff cAL and below will spend more effort in order to keep the firm
from bankruptcy and secure their salary (unless this is too costly for them which results in exits of the
least productive firms).
To see that a reduction in the cost cutoff cL results in more effort of firms with initial cost draw cOL (and
higher, until cost are too high and they exit), consider that
ψAU

cAL
	
 β
?
sLa
γ p1 βq  
β
?
sLa
γ p1 βq   c
A
L  cOL  ψOU

cAL
	
For cAL   c   cOU , effort also increases:
ψAU pcq  ψAU

cAL
	
  c cAL   ψOU

cAL
	
  c cAL  ψOUpcq
Firms with high cost, c ¡ cOU , exit.
Export access. For the most efficient firms, i.e. those with c  0, effort is larger in the open economy
(holding Q fixed, as this is the import competition channel):
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ψOXp0q 
βL
2γ βL p1  τq2 pα ηQq ¡
βL
2γ βL pα ηQq  ψ
A
L p0q
because
2
2γ βL p1  τq ¡
1
2γ βL
As firm are less productive and have higher initial cost draw, the change in effort becomes smaller:
B pψXpcq  ψLpcqq
Bc  βL
2τγ
p2γ βL p1  τqq p2γ βLq   0
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